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Abstract
We investigate the spread of diseases, computer viruses or information on complex networks and also
immunization strategies to prevent or control the spread. When an entire population cannot be immunized
and the effect of immunization is not perfect, we need the targeted immunization with immunization rate.
Under such a circumstance we calculate epidemic thresholds for the SIR and SIS epidemic models. It is shown
that, in scale-free networks, the targeted immunization is effective only if the immunization rate is equal to
one. We analyze here epidemic spreading on directed complex networks, but similar results are also valid for
undirected ones.
1. Introduction
The spread of diseases, computer viruses or infor-
mation in complex networks such as social networks,
the WWW and Internet has attracted researchers’ at-
tention in various fields. We refer to [2, 3, 8] and ref-
erences therein for abundant examples of complex net-
works. Also preventing the spread has extensively been
investigated. A typical method to prevent or control
an epidemic spread is immunization such as vaccination
[5]. Generally, it is difficult or impossible to perfectly
immunize an entire population, so the object or target
of immunization must be prescribed. However in turn,
all of target individuals may not be immunized due to,
for example, lack of plenty of time and resources, other-
wise because some are overlooked. We describe this sit-
uation as ”imperfect immunization to targeted nodes”.
Nodes are sometimes called vertices or individuals. In
another aspect, vaccination or a treatment cannot pro-
vide sufficient immunity upon target nodes, which we
call ”insufficient immunity”. Therefore, we have to in-
troduce a parameter α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) called immunization
rate for such both cases. As in [12] we assume that α
is a constant throughout.
In [10] some immunization schemes are evaluated in
the SIS model on undirected networks and [4] also of-
fers other schemes for immunization, and [12] provides
targeted immunization strategies in the SIR model. All
those studies are devoted to undirected. In undirected
networks links (or edges) do not have directions or they
are bidirectional by nature.
However, one can find many directed complex net-
works [2, 3, 8] in nature, society, and artificial struc-
tures; food webs, phone-call networks, the WWW, etc.
The indegree of a node is the number of incoming links
into the node and the outdegree is that of outgoing
links emanating from it. If the indegree and outdegree
distributions of a directed network follow power laws:
P (k) ∝ k−γ and Q(ℓ) ∝ ℓ−γ
′
for indegrees k and outdegrees ℓ, and if the exponents
satisfy 2 < γ, γ′ ≤ 3, then the network is called scale-
free. Undirected networks make no distinction between
both degree distributions.
The direction plays an important role in the study
of epidemic spreading on a directed network. Diseases,
computer viruses or information are transmitted to
other nodes (or vertices) through outgoing links and
a node is infected by incoming links. We derive the
critical infection rate or the threshold, above which a
disease spreads in the networks and below which it dies
out.
First we prescribe a target set of immunization in
terms of indegrees and outdegrees on directed networks.
We derive the thresholds for the SIR and SIS epidemic
dynamics involving the target set and an immunization
rate α. Actually they turn out the same for both. In
the SIR model, the averaged fraction of nodes that are
ever infected until the disease dies out is also given.
Finally, based on thresholds, we will discuss whether
immunization strategies are effective or not in scale-
free networks. In particular, all targeted immunization
schemes are shown to be effective only if α = 1, which
was assumed in [10] from the beginning.
Since undirected networks are simpler than directed
ones, we immediately see that similar results hold on
undirected networks by the arguments presented here,
and they are also partially found in [4] for the SIS
model and in [12] for the SIR model.
2. Models of immunization in complex
networks
In this section we introduce preliminary definitions
and model epidemic spreading with immunization rate.
Our model is based on [11], where epidemic spread-
ing with no immunization is discussed on directed net-
works. First we treat the SIR model and later proceed
to the SIS model which is regarded as a special case of
the SIR model.
In the SIR model, nodes of the network are di-
vided into the following three groups regarding infec-
1
tion states ([5], [7, Chap. 10]): Susceptible (S), Infected
(I) and Removed (R). In order to deal with immuniza-
tion such as vaccination, we add one more state: Im-
munized. Outgoing links emanating from immunized
nodes are harmless.
Hereafter we will denote a susceptible node by an
S-node etc., for short. An S-node becomes infected at
a rate of λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1). The parameter λ is the infec-
tion rate, for which we will derive the critical value for
an outbreak of a disease, a computer virus, etc. The
disease can be passed from I-nodes to S-nodes follow-
ing only the direction of directed links. R-nodes have
either recovered from the disease or died and so they
cannot pass the disease to others. An I-node becomes
an R-node at a rate δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) and, without loss of
generality, we will set δ = 1.
Let p(k, ℓ) be the joint probability distribution of
nodes with indegree k and outdegree ℓ, and let us de-
note the marginal distributions by
P (k) =
∑
ℓ
p(k, ℓ), Q(ℓ) =
∑
k
p(k, ℓ)
and the averages by
〈k〉 =
∑
k,ℓ
kp(k, ℓ) =
∑
k
kP (k),
〈ℓ〉 =
∑
k,ℓ
ℓp(k, ℓ) =
∑
ℓ
ℓQ(ℓ),
〈kℓ〉 =
∑
k,ℓ
kℓp(k, ℓ).
We denote by T the object or target set for immu-
nization that is characterized in terms of indegrees and
outdegrees, T¯ being the complement of T that is not
an object of immunization. The notation (k, ℓ) ∈ T
means that the population of all nodes with indegree k
and outdegree ℓ is an object of immunization. In case
of T = {(k, ℓ)|k > K}, for example, the population of
all nodes with indegrees exceeding a number K is col-
lectively an object of immunization. The summation
restricted to all (k, ℓ) in T will be denoted by
∑
T , and
similarly for T¯ by
∑
T¯ . Furthermore, the average of the
product kℓ over T is denoted by 〈kℓ〉T :
〈kℓ〉T =
∑
(k,ℓ)∈T
kℓp(k, ℓ) =
∑
T
kℓp(k, ℓ).
In this paper we assume that the immunization rate
α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) is a constant as in [12], although it can
be dependent on k and ℓ as well. In the following two
models A and B, remark that α has different mean-
ings, althought the same notation is used. Within the
population of all nodes with indegree k and outdegree
ℓ, variables Sk,ℓ(t), ρk,ℓ(t), Rk,ℓ(t) indicate the densities
of S-, I-, R-nodes at time t, respectively. Naturally,
by setting k = ℓ, the same arguments are applied to
undirected networks.
A. Imperfect immunization to targeted nodes
This is the case where all of target nodes in T cannot
be immunized, because some are overlooked or hidden
etc., and α is like the vaccine coverage within T .
Since there are no rewiring of links and immunized
nodes are no longer S-nodes, we have
Sk,ℓ(t) + ρk,ℓ(t) +Rk,ℓ(t) =
{
1− α, (k, ℓ) ∈ T,
1, (k, ℓ) ∈ T¯ ,
(1)
The condition α = 1 implies the perfect immunization
for T , while α = 0 means no immunization, which co-
incides with the simple SIR model [11].
Following the dynamical mean-field theory ([6, 9,
10]), we see that the spreading process on a directed
network can be described by the system of differential
equations:
dSk,ℓ
dt
= −λkSk,ℓ(t)θ(t), (2)
dρk,ℓ
dt
= λkSk,ℓ(t)θ(t) − ρk,ℓ(t), (3)
dRk,ℓ
dt
= ρk,ℓ(t). (4)
The term λkSk,ℓ(t)θ(t) in (2) and (3) indicates the frac-
tion of newly infected nodes through k incoming links,
while θ(t) is the probability of contact with I-nodes
from whose outgoing links the disease spreads. Hence
θ(t) can be written in parts as
θ(t) =
1∑
k,ℓ
ℓp(k, ℓ)
(∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)ρk,ℓ(t)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)ρk,ℓ(t)
)
, (5)
for the later use. Here the denominator is the average
〈ℓ〉 and each directed link is counted twice as one out-
degree of some node and as one indegree of another.
Hence the average outdegree is equal to the average
indegree: 〈ℓ〉 = 〈k〉. From (1) the initial conditions
imposed upon Sk,ℓ are
Sk,ℓ(0) =
{
1− α, (k, ℓ) ∈ T,
1, (k, ℓ) ∈ T¯ .
(6)
The initial values of other variables are assumed to be
zero or nearly zero.
B. Insufficient immunity
This model is applied to the case, for example,
where vaccination or a treatment cannot provide suf-
ficient immunity upon the target nodes in T , so the
rate α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) represents the immunity effect. The
higher it is, the less infected S-nodes in T become. The
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differential equations are divided into two parts. First,
for (k, ℓ) ∈ T , it follows that
dSk,ℓ
dt
= −λk(1− α)Sk,ℓ(t)θ(t), (7)
dρk,ℓ
dt
= λk(1− α)Sk,ℓ(t)θ(t) − ρk,ℓ(t), (8)
dRk,ℓ
dt
= ρk,ℓ(t). (9)
Secondly, for (k, ℓ) ∈ T¯ , Eqs. (2)–(4) remain valid. The
probability θ is the same as (5) and the initial condition
imposed upon Sk,ℓ is
Sk,ℓ(0) = 1
for all k and ℓ. The initial values of other variables are
zero or nearly zero.
The next section analyzes models A and B in di-
rected complex networks with target set T and with
immunization rate α. In Section 4 the corresponding
SIS models are considered. Actually all thresholds turn
out the same. It is easy to see that the following argu-
ments can be applied to models A and B considered in
undirected complex networks.
3. Epidemic spreading in the SIR model
A. Imperfect immunization to targeted nodes
To begin with we solve Eq. (2) under the initial
conditions (6):
Sk,ℓ(t) =
{
(1− α)e−λkφ(t) for (k, ℓ) ∈ T,
e−λkφ(t) for (k, ℓ) ∈ T¯ ,
(10)
where
φ(t) =
∫ t
0
θ(t′)dt′.
By (4), (5) and Rk,ℓ(0) = 0 for all k and ℓ, φ(t) has an
expression:
φ(t) =
1
〈ℓ〉
{∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)
∫ t
0
ρk,ℓ(t
′)dt′
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)
∫ t
0
ρk,ℓ(t
′)dt′
}
(11)
=
1
〈ℓ〉
{∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)Rk,ℓ(t)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)Rk,ℓ(t)
}
.
To derive the differential equation for φ(t), we use (1),
(10) and (11). Then it follows that
dφ(t)
dt
=
1
〈ℓ〉
{∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)ρk,ℓ(t) +
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)ρk,ℓ(t)
}
=
1
〈ℓ〉
{∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)
(
1− α−Rk,ℓ(t)− Sk,ℓ(t)
)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)
(
1−Rk,ℓ(t)− Sk,ℓ(t)
)}
=
1
〈ℓ〉
{∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)
(
1− α− Sk,ℓ(t)
)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)
(
1− Sk,ℓ(t)
)}
− φ(t) (12)
=
1
〈ℓ〉
{∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)
(
1− α− (1 − α)e−λkφ(t)
)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)
(
1− e−λkφ(t)
)}
− φ(t)
=
1
〈ℓ〉
{
(1− α)
∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)
(
1− e−λkφ(t)
)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)
(
1− e−λkφ(t)
)}
− φ(t).
We are concerned with a steady state of the epi-
demic spreading, for which one has a limit
Φ = lim
t→∞
φ(t),
together with the condition
lim
t→∞
dφ(t)
dt
= 0.
Substituting these two into Eq. (12), we get the equa-
tion for Φ as follows:
Φ =
1
〈ℓ〉
{
(1 − α)
∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)(1− e−λkΦ)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)(1− e−λkΦ)
}
. (13)
An epidemic outbreak implies that this equation has
a solution Φ > 0 other than Φ = 0. Since the right hand
side of (13) is a monotone increasing and concave func-
tion of Φ and its value at Φ = 1 is less than 1, the
condition for it is
d
dΦ
1
〈ℓ〉
{
(1− α)
∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)(1− e−λkΦ)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)(1− e−λkΦ)
}∣∣
Φ=0
≥ 1.
Thus the critical threshold λc is expressed as
λc =
〈ℓ〉
(1− α)
∑
T kℓp(k, ℓ) +
∑
T¯ kℓp(k, ℓ)
. (14)
Alternatively, using the identity∑
T¯
kℓp(k, ℓ) = 〈kℓ〉 −
∑
T
kℓp(k, ℓ),
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(14) is equal to
λc =
〈ℓ〉
〈kℓ〉 − α〈kℓ〉T
. (15)
In [7, Chap.10] the total number of infected indi-
viduals is discussed for the classical SIR model, which
represents the final outbreak size O. In our setting it
is the averaged fraction of nodes ever infected until the
disease dies out. Using the solutions (10), this is writ-
ten as
O =
∑
k,ℓ
p(k, ℓ)(1− Sk,ℓ(∞))
= 1−
∑
T
p(k, ℓ)Sk,ℓ(∞)−
∑
T¯
p(k, ℓ)Sk,ℓ(∞)
= 1− (1− α)
∑
T
p(k, ℓ)e−λkΦ −
∑
T¯
p(k, ℓ)e−λkΦ
= 1−
∑
k,ℓ
p(k, ℓ)e−λkΦ + α
∑
T
p(k, ℓ)e−λkΦ
= 1−
∑
k
P (k)e−λkΦ + α
∑
T
p(k, ℓ)e−λkΦ. (16)
The last term of the right hand side provides the effect
of an immunization.
As an illustrative example let us consider an im-
munization of nodes with large indegrees. This means
T = {(k, ℓ)|k > K} or
Sk,ℓ(t) + ρk,ℓ(t) +Rk,ℓ(t) =
{
1− α, k > K,
1, k ≤ K,
where K is a certain large value of the indegree. The
corresponding initial conditions imposed upon Sk,ℓ are
Sk,ℓ(0) =
{
1− α, k > K,
1, k ≤ K.
The initial values of other variables are zero or nealy
zero.
Using the solution Φ of Eq. (13) for this case, we
obtain the fraction (16) of the outbreak size:
O = 1−
∑
k
P (k)e−λkΦ + α
∑
k>K
P (k)e−λkΦ,
by means of the indegree distribution P (k). If the in-
degree distribution follows a power law
P (k) ∝ k−γ , k ≥ m
with γ > 1, then P (k) = (γ − 1)mγ−1k−γ (k ≥ m),
where m is the minimum indegree. Defining the incom-
plete gamma function [1, p.260] by
Γ(a, x) =
∫ ∞
x
ta−1e−tdt,
we can write the fraction (16) of the outbreak size as
O = 1−
∫ ∞
m
P (k)e−λkΦdk + α
∫ ∞
K
P (k)e−λkΦdk
= 1− (γ − 1)(λmΦ)γ−1Γ(1− γ, λmΦ)
+ α(γ − 1)(λKΦ)γ−1Γ(1− γ, λKΦ),
by the continuous approximation.
B. Insufficient immunity
Since similar arguments used in A are also applied
to this model, we only give an outline of the analysis.
Solving (7)–(9) under the initial condition Sk,ℓ(0) = 1
for all (k, ℓ), we have, in place of (10) and (13),
Sk,ℓ(t) =
{
e−λ(1−α)kφ(t) for (k, ℓ) ∈ T,
e−λkφ(t) for (k, ℓ) ∈ T¯ ,
and
Φ =
1
〈ℓ〉
{∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)(1− e−λ(1−α)kΦ)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)(1− e−λkΦ)
}
,
respectively. Solving the following equation for λ,
d
dΦ
1
〈ℓ〉
{∑
T
ℓp(k, ℓ)(1− e−λ(1−α)kΦ)
+
∑
T¯
ℓp(k, ℓ)(1− e−λkΦ)
}∣∣
Φ=0
= 1,
we again obtain (14) and (15). When T = {(k, ℓ)|k >
K} as above, the averaged fraction of nodes ever in-
fected until the disease dies out becomes
O = 1−
∑
k>K
P (k)e−λ(1−α)kΦ −
∑
k≤K
P (k)e−λkΦ,
by an application of (16).
4. Epidemic spreading in the SIS model
In the SIS model, R-nodes are absent and nodes
that recovered from the disease cannot acquire eternal
immunity and may be infected again and again. Let T
and α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) be the same as before in the mod-
els A and B. The differential equations for the densities
Sk,ℓ(t), ρk,ℓ(t) of S-, I-nodes at time t are easily derived
from those for the SIR models in Section 2.
A. Imperfect immunization to targeted nodes
In this case, remarking (1), we have
Sk,ℓ(t) =
{
1− α− ρk,ℓ(t), for (k, ℓ) ∈ T,
1− ρk,ℓ(t), for (k, ℓ) ∈ T¯ .
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Therefore, Eqs. (2)–(4) in Section 2 are replaced by the
differential equations
dρk,ℓ(t)
dt
=


λk(1− α− ρk,ℓ(t))θ(t) − ρk,ℓ(t),
if (k, ℓ) ∈ T,
λk(1− ρk,ℓ(t))θ(t) − ρk,ℓ(t),
if (k, ℓ) ∈ T¯ ,
(17)
where θ(t) is the same probability as (5).
At the steady state, as in Section 3, we will have
the condition
lim
t→∞
dρk,ℓ
dt
= 0
for all k and ℓ, and a limit
Θ = lim
t→∞
θ(t).
So we get from (17),
lim
t→∞
ρk,ℓ(t) =
{
(1 − α)λkΘ/(1 + λkΘ), if (k, ℓ) ∈ T,
λkΘ/(1 + λkΘ), if (k, ℓ) ∈ T¯ .
Substituting these into (5) and letting t → ∞, we
have the equation for Θ as follows:
Θ =
1
〈ℓ〉(1 + λkΘ)
(∑
T
(1− α)λkℓp(k, ℓ)Θ
+
∑
T¯
λkℓp(k, ℓ)Θ
)
.
If this has a solution Θ > 0 other than Θ = 0, then it
corresponds to an endemic state. Since the right hand
side of the equation is a monotone increasing and con-
cave function of Θ and its value at Θ = 1 is less than
1, the condition for an endemic outbreak is
d
dΘ
1
〈ℓ〉
(∑
T
(1− α)λkℓp(k, ℓ)Θ
1 + λkΘ
+
∑
T¯
λkℓp(k, ℓ)Θ
1 + λkΘ
)∣∣∣
Θ=0
≥ 1.
Again, this yields the same threshold (14) or (15) as
the model A for the SIR model:
λc =
〈ℓ〉
〈kℓ〉 − α
∑
T kℓp(k, ℓ)
=
〈ℓ〉
〈kℓ〉 − α〈kℓ〉T
.
B. Insufficient immunity
This model just coincides with Eq. (10) of [4] for
the SIS model on undirected networks. Taking Eq. (3)
for T¯ and Eq. (8) for T , we get
dρk,ℓ(t)
dt
=


λk(1− α)(1 − ρk,ℓ(t))θ(t) − ρk,ℓ(t),
if (k, ℓ) ∈ T,
λk(1− ρk,ℓ(t))θ(t) − ρk,ℓ(t),
if (k, ℓ) ∈ T¯ .
Using this equation for (17) and repeating the above
calculations, we obtain again the same threshold (14)
or (15) as in A.
5. Immunization strategies
We have seen that the thresholds are all the same
in four cases. So in any one of them we can evaluate
immunization strategies based on the thresholds. In
view of (14) or (15), to control epidemic outbreaks, it
is desirable to choose the set T so that 〈kℓ〉T becomes
as large as possible, and T should be a considerably
small region compared to the entire population from a
practical point of view.
First remark that in case of no immunization (α =
0) the epidemic threshold is equal to
λ◦c =
〈ℓ〉
〈kℓ〉
,
by (14) or (15).
If the entire population is an object for immu-
nization, that is, T¯ is empty, then from the identity
〈kℓ〉T = 〈kℓ〉 the threshold due to this global immu-
nization is
λˆc =
〈ℓ〉
〈kℓ〉 − α〈kℓ〉T
=
1
1− α
〈ℓ〉
〈kℓ〉
.
Suppose α < 1. Then the threshold for any targeted
immunization satisfies
λc =
〈ℓ〉
〈kℓ〉 − α〈kℓ〉T
≤ λˆc =
1
1− α
λ◦c , (18)
since 〈kℓ〉T ≤ 〈kℓ〉 always holds. Therefore, in case of
α < 1, certainly any targeted immunization is not more
than the global immunization.
Suppose that in addition to α < 1 considered net-
works are scale-free as presented in Section 1. Scale-
free networks are prone to have very large 〈kℓ〉; λ◦c ≈ 0,
under a high correlation between nodal indegrees and
outdegrees [11]. In such a case inequality (18) tells us
that any targeted immunization is not effective: λc ≈ 0.
Next supposing α = 1, let us consider a simple tar-
get set T by defining T¯ = {(k, ℓ)|k, ℓ ≤ M} for some
positive M . This yields
〈kℓ〉T¯ =
∑
k,ℓ≤M
kℓp(k, ℓ) < M2,
and hence, even in scale-free networks, we are able to
conclude
λc =
〈ℓ〉
〈kℓ〉 − 〈kℓ〉T
=
〈ℓ〉
〈kℓ〉T¯
>
〈ℓ〉
M2
> λ◦c ≈ 0,
which implies the effectiveness of the targeted immu-
nization only under the condition α = 1. The choice
of a desirable target set T depends on the probability
distribution p(k, ℓ), so this estimate may be improved
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further.
Finally, as for undirected networks, there is no dis-
tinction between indegrees and outdegrees. So, setting
k = ℓ in (15), the threshold of an epidemic outbreak
can be written in our notation as
λc =
〈k〉
〈k2〉 − α〈k2〉T
,
for an immunization rate α and a target set T that is
characterized by the degree k. Using this, we see that
similar results of this section hold for undirected net-
works. Note that in [12] the target set was assumed to
be T = {k|k > K} for a large number K, namely a set
of hub nodes. In this case the targeted immunization
is not effective unless it confers 100 percent immunity
on all hub nodes in T .
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